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Socialist republicans claim public ownership of productive property can curtail economic 
domination. Harrison Frye makes a lucid case for doubting this conclusion.1 Firstly, public 
ownership may decrease economic efficiency due to high negotiation and agency costs. When this 
results in fewer economic goods being available to meet people’s basic needs, then they will be 
more vulnerable to domination. Secondly, managers can evade the accountability that would keep 
dominating power in check if groups with heterogenous interests participate in economic 
governance, since these groups can be played off against one another, under conditions where 
criteria for judging managerial performance are muddied. 
 Frye is correct to think economic efficiency and managerial accountability are important 
considerations when evaluating our institutions from a republican standpoint. They join many 
other factors which can influence the extent of domination, including the health, education, and 
happiness of the citizenry, the distribution of wealth, power, and status among them, the presence 
of the conditions for security, solidarity, and political stability, and so on. Socialist economic 
prescriptions must ultimately be assessed from a republican perspective that takes the whole sweep 
of such factors into account. But even considered in isolation, Frye’s appeals to efficiency and 
accountability do not tell against socialist republicanism. 
 Does public ownership decrease economic efficiency? Frye suggests two familiar reasons 
why the form of public ownership which I recommend might do so.2 Negotiation costs are pushed 
down in investor-owned firms because shareholders tend to agree that profit matters most. When 
there are multiple stakeholders with heterogeneous goals, however, reaching collective decisions 
can be more onerous, with additional process costs reducing efficiency. Agency costs in investor-
owned firms also tend to be relatively low because profitability provides a simple albeit imperfect 
criterion for monitoring the performance of managers to ensure they are not pursuing their interests 
at the expense of the owners. But if there are numerous participants in economic governance whose 
goals diverge, then oversight of managers becomes more difficult, with a fractured group of 
stakeholders being easier to exploit. 
 Let us suppose these theorised effects are real. There are, however, reasons to think that 
alternatives to investor-owned firms can bolster economic efficiency in other respects. Even 
among champions of the transaction cost approach which Frye draws upon, there is 
acknowledgement that worker-owned enterprises may benefit from higher retention of 
experienced staff, better communication of worker preferences, and more effective oversight of 
workers.3 Greater control by workers without direct worker-ownership might also increase 
efficiency in other ways. For example, the daily experience and expertise which workers acquire 
from their familiarity with the operations of their workplaces can make them better at monitoring 
management than distant and information-poor shareholders. Moreover, it has been argued that 
worker participation in economic governance will lead workers to be less alienated in their jobs 
and so be more productive.4 The abstract theory of the firm does not give us a clear-cut answer 
then as to the relative efficiency of alternative models of ownership and control.  
Looking to the real economy might help us fare better. Frye suggests that the 
preponderance of shareholder-owned firms in the modern economy could be explained by the 
efficiency costs of alternatives. But this hypothesis needs much greater empirical support to be 
convincing, since there are many other factors which could account for the dominance of this form: 
political opposition from capitalists or workers themselves, path-dependency effects, lack of 
institutional support, contingent systemic biases in the wider economy, and so on.5 Furthermore, 
if we simply ask more directly whether public ownership in particular has actually been shown to 
be less efficient, the answer is no. As one recent wide-ranging survey of the empirical literature on 
economic efficiency concludes, “decades of studies have yielded no consensus as to the relative 
economic merits of public versus private ownership”, with many empirical assessments showing 
greater productivity growth and efficiency, or no significant deficits, when contrasted with 
investor-owned enterprises.6  
Public ownership does not, then, appear to often impose burdensome efficiency losses. 
Frye is careful not to commit to the contrary conclusion – simply maintaining that efficiency ought 
to be taken into account. Indeed, it is to have special purchase in debates about domination, since 
wealth can insulate citizens from dominating power (as I myself argue).7 While Frye recognises 
distribution as well as efficiency matters if high economic output is to contribute to reducing 
domination, this thought is not pursued in relation to public ownership specifically. Consider two 
scenarios: (i) high levels of public ownership leads to lower economic efficiency and total output, 
but workers have high levels of control in their workplaces and the citizenry as a whole has high 
levels of control over economic output; (ii) low levels of public ownership leads to higher 
economic efficiency and total output, but workers have little of control in their workplaces and the 
citizenry has lower levels of control over economic output. On the assumption that greater control 
for workers and citizens will lead to a more egalitarian economic distribution, and in the absence 
of truly precipitous efficiency declines, then the first scenario could be significantly better at 
shielding citizens from domination purely in terms of the money in people’s pockets and the basic 
services readily available to them. This effect would obtain even without further redistribution 
through additional fiscal measures, or the introduction of a universal basic income and services. In 
short, the distributional effects of public ownership itself on non-domination may more than offset 
potential efficiency costs. 
 Efficiency arguments against socialist republicanism are not ultimately convincing. 
Potential efficiency costs of public ownership need to be weighed against potential efficiency 
benefits from greater worker participation and oversight of management. There is no conclusive 
argument to demonstrate that alternatives to investor-owned firms are currently sparse because of 
low efficiency. The actual empirical evidence in relation to public ownership is itself mixed, and 
does not give us a strong reason to think there will be prohibitive declines in efficiency. Moreover, 
the egalitarian distributional effects of public ownership with significant worker and citizen control 
are likely to outweigh efficiency costs with respect to the influence on dominating power. None of 
this requires us to take the further step of shifting the focus from technical and productive 
efficiency to consider social efficiency and the externalities that investor-owned firms impose on 
citizens. 
Frye raises another line of objection to socialist republican remedies which – although 
emerging from concerns about agency costs – can, it seems to me, be articulated independently of 
the threat of low technical or productive efficiency under public ownership. It emphasises the 
difficulty of ensuring that managers are held accountable when multiple stakeholders with 
heterogenous interests are participants in economic governance. Let us grant that managers and 
some degree of managerial discretion are needed in any large-scale economic enterprise. If 
domination is not to result, this necessitates mechanisms for accountability in the exercise of 
managerial power, because “discretion opens up the possibility of using that power in a way that 
does not track the interests of those over which they have power”.8 But the polyarchic form of 
public ownership which I advocate is thought to impede this accountability “by both complicating 
the metric of wrongdoing and allowing managers to play politics”. When there is no single simple 
criterion like profitability to use to judge a manager’s performance, then the business of assessing 
and holding them to account for wrongdoing becomes messier. Furthermore, if multiple principals 
with different aims and interests are tasked with monitoring an agent, then that agent can use the 
lack of a unified front among them to avoid oversight. 
 My suspicion is that a fatal equivocation has occurred here in how accountability is 
understood. There can indeed be difficulties in ensuring managers are accountable when multiple 
stakeholders with different and sometimes competing interests are tasked with governance. But 
the problems this introduces are primarily those of accountability to the stakeholders rather than 
accountability that tracks the interests of everyone that managerial power is held over. Take 
investor-ownership, where the shared profit-motive of the principals can make it easier for them 
to take a stand against behaviour that can hurt the bottom line: shirking, nepotism, recklessness, 
stealing, and other forms of financial mismanagement. The power of managers is thus more easily 
made to track the interests of shareholders, who are thereby less subject to the arbitrary will of 
management. But what about others subject to managerial power – such as workers who encounter 
managerial power more intimately and viscerally in their daily lives? We might hope a 
monomaniacal focus on profit or dividends will lead shareholders to keep in check some of the 
managerial excesses that harm workers – for instance, sexist or racist discrimination that would 
lead valuable employees to leave unnecessarily. But the accountability of managers to shareholders 
in investor-owned firms very often drives a rapacious and arbitrary exercise of power over workers 
rather than shielding them from it. If the one thing shareholders care about is profit, then managers 
will have free reign to use the tremendous power at their disposal to pressure, bully, exploit, and 
lie to workers in pursuit of these ends. How is this form of managerial accountability forcing their 
power to track the interests of the workers over whom it is held? 
 Similar lessons apply to arbitrary managerial power over consumers and citizens. The 
discretion to engage in price gouging with respect to an important medicine will not be rendered 
non-arbitrary by accountability to shareholders who agree that profit maximisation is the primary 
metric for assessing managerial performance – at least, in the absence of sufficient reputational 
damage to the firm. Nor will accountability to profit-hungry shareholders be a restraint on the 
arbitrary power of managers to shut down a factory, supermarket, or utility which the local 
community relies upon. The decision-making process in these cases is indifferent to the interests 
of a great many of those who managerial power is held over. Workers, consumers, and citizens 
alike are not, then, effectively shielded from domination by managerial accountability to 
shareholders. Indeed, the opposite is true: this form of economic governance lets arbitrary power 
run wild. A narrow focus on the principal-agent relationship merely between stakeholder and 
manager can blind us to this fact. 
 Socialist republicans believe we can reduce economic domination by ensuring control of 
economic institutions more closely reflects those affected by their activities. That many different 
interests will have to be negotiated is therefore no surprise. As Hélène Landemore and Isabelle 
Ferreras tell us, “it is precisely because of the heterogeneity of interests at play that more 
democracy and more workers’ participation is needed.”9 Whatever the limitations of the investor-
owned firm in stemming domination, does the multiplicity of voices under an inclusive form of 
public ownership nevertheless create such a cacophony that domination goes undetected and 
unchecked? Frye worries that such an approach will overcomplicate the metric of wrongdoing for 
managers, whereas I have suggested that profit alone is simply the wrong measuring stick if we 
care about domination. I do not deny that more democratically-responsive standards of 
accountability are likely to be more difficult to quantify. But Amartya Sen’s maxim for social 
measurement is salutary here: “it is undoubtedly more important to be vaguely right than to be 
precisely wrong.”10 
 There may be some truth to Frye’s related claim that managers or other potential 
dominators could play stakeholders with different interest off against one another in an attempt to 
escape effective monitoring and regulation. Against this should be weighed some of the possible 
benefits of being able to draw upon a larger and more diverse group in the oversight of potential 
dominators. Aristotle recognised some of these merits of collective governance when he observed 
that “each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when 
they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and 
senses, so too with regard to their character and thought”.11 What may be lost in cohesiveness of 
vision and purpose in this transformation may be gained in the expansion of capacities for scrutiny, 
deliberation, and action. 
Nevertheless, socialist republicans should be attentive to some of the trade-offs that might 
be involved in pursuing an inclusive form of public ownership that seeks worker, consumer, and 
citizen participation, when contrasted with a more centralised and top-down ‘Morrisonian’ model 
of public ownership through nationalisation and state control.12 When public ownership is 
polyarchic then it itself avoids placing dominating concentrations of power in hands of the few, 
but the lack of a single stakeholder like the state may mean that the socialist republican has to think 
more creatively about institutional mechanisms that could dampen the ability of other potential 
dominators to slip through the cracks. But this is an instance of a general tension in republican 
governance: a highly unified power that could quash domination – whether in the hands of private 
shareholders or the state – risks being overmighty enough to constitute domination. My view is 
that an economy based around investor-owned firms not only does not escape this tension, but 
succumbs to it in a particularly egregious way, since the stakeholder power it grants to a 
homogenous group of profit-seeking shareholders tends to accelerate rather than block domination 
elsewhere in the firm in addition to being directly dominating itself. In short, it is the worst of both 
worlds. 
 In conclusion, I am not convinced on grounds of efficiency or accountability that socialist 
republicanism would fail to curtail the economic domination rife in capitalist societies. Frye’s 
critique can be restated in terms of three searching questions for the form of public ownership I 
favour. Will it significantly reduce economic efficiency? Would such a reduction increase 
domination? Will a lack of managerial accountability increase domination? My answer to all three 
questions has been no. I have argued that neither theoretical considerations nor the empirical 
evidence establishes that public ownership is particularly susceptible to a decline in technical or 
productive efficiency. Even if we did find this effect empirically, the egalitarian distributive effects 
of public ownership are likely to be more decisive in ensuring that the needy are not left so 
economically vulnerable that they are susceptible to domination. Finally, the managerial 
accountability imposed by investor-owned firms takes the wrong form to shield workers, 
consumers, and citizens from dominating managerial power, even if it protects the financial 
interests of shareholders. Frye has presented some interesting challenges – but socialist 
republicanism passes the test. 
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